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STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:311 defendants could reap the benefits of pleading guilty while still getting enhancement hearings at sentencing. Now, however, enhancements are elements of the offense. Pressure to plead guilty simultaneously pressures defendants to give up enhancement issues. To this extent, defendants lose hearing rights and are worse off.
Professors King and Klein object to my considering the possibility of guilty pleas, without plea agreements, fo llowed by sentencing hearings, as most at 296. This assumption ignores my point that prosecutors seek not only to maximize sentences, but also to minimize trials and workloads by trading lower sentences for pleas.
See George Fisher, Plea Barg aining ·s Triumph, I 09 YALE L.J. 857 , 865, 882-83 , 893-903 (2000) . Thus, even if the prosecution has a good shot of winning at trial, it may not press ceriain enhancements against a defendant who would otherwise plead guilty because the threat of a huge enhancement may induce the defendant to try to avoid the enhancement by rolling the dice at trial. And in many cases, the prosecution's only options are to press the entire enhancement (forcing a trial) or drop it entirely (in return for a plea). Massive enhancements (such as recidivism enhancements) are so large and discrete that they operate as sledgehammers, not scalpels. They can be traded off to prevent trials but cannot be parceled out more finely to tailor the terms of a pariicular plea. See Bibas, supra note I, at I 153-54 n.342 .
Professors King and Klein further suggest that the parties may avoid most of the costs of trial by agreeing to expedited bench trials on enhancements. King & Klein. supra note I, at 306 n.42. While this procedural vehicle may eventually evolve, by and large it has not done so yet, and prosecutors have little incentive to make it easier for defendants to secure hearings.
More hearings would give judges more opponunities to check prosecutorial charging and plea decisions, which judges and defendants might favor but prosecutors would not.
In the federal system, 28 states, and the District of Columbia, prosecutors can unilaterally veto bench trials and thwari this maneuver. Bibas, supra note I, at 1155 n.346 (also noting that a 29th state forbids bench trials entirely regardless of the panics' consent).
Finally, Professors King and Klein claim that the Depanment of Justice's Thornburgh memorandum prevents prosecutors from forgoing readily provable enhancements. King & Klein, supro note 1, at 297 n. l8. When Janet Reno succeeded William BarT as Attomcy General, however, she promulgated furiher guidance to federal prosecutors that gave them more leeway in deciding which charges to press. See Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to all Holders of U.S. Attorney's Manual (Reno Blueshect on Charging and Plea Decisions), Oct. 12, 1993 , reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCTNG REP. 352 ( 1994 ) (endorsing plea bargaining "on the basis of an individualized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with the purposes of the federal criminal code, and maximize the impact of federal resources on crime"). Compare this with UNTTED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL� 9-27 . 400 (!999 ); Professors King and Klein, at p.3 n.l8, quote the manual as saying that prosecutors should not bargain away readily provable charges, but they fail to note an exception in the same section that allows supervisors to approve charge bargaining for other reasons, such as lightening a heavy prosecutorial workload. And whatever the fom1al doctrine on paper, prosecutors do in practice take into account their caseloads and trial burdens in their charging and plea decisions. Sec .Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad J-/oc ?leo Barg aining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695. 707-10 (2001) (summarizing various empirical studies, all of which found that bans on plea bargaining broke down, and suggesting that plea bargaining may be inevitable); Robc11 A. \Veninger, The Aholi1ion ol Plea Barg aining: A Cosr: Stud\' oj E! Paw CountY, Tc.ws. 35 UCLA L. REV. 265. 265, 311-13 ( 1987) (noting that empirical study showed that plea b:1rgaining resurfaced in one county despite an official ban and suggesting that evidence shows that bargaining is inevitable regardless of official policy). 851-54 (9th Cir. 1994 ) , is inapposite. It involved no issues of base offenses versus enhanced offenses or quanti ties. but simply a confused, contrite defendant who merited acceptance-of responsibility credit because (I) the court had prevented him from pleading guilty, (2) he had made a full confession right after an·cst, (3) he had assisted the authorities, and (4) he had put on a "'minimal and perfunctory'' defense at trial. The Court could extend App,.cndi to strike down these provisions of the Guidelines. but only Justice Thomas expressed a willingness to do so. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.l l (Thomas .
.1 .
• concurring). It seems unlikely that all five members of the bare majority in ilpprendi would be willing to take such a dramatic step. as doing so would effectively abolish the whole Guidelines system and invalidate hundreds of thousands, i r not mi i lions, of sentences.
See Bibas. supra note I, at 1140. This check need not be in the hands of judges alone. Sentencing
caused the most disruption in the federal system and a few states such as Illinois, California, Colorado, and Ohio, but it is hard to draw solid conclusions from such a small sample size.
See supra note 14 (discussing why Apprendi will affect some states more severely than others).
These decisions did not tum on the procedural obstacles to raising post-conviction claims. Rather, they reasoned that appellate judges should affirm sentences where trial judges could and would have used consecutive sentences to achieve the same result in the first instance. So these cases pave the way for future prosecutors to charge multiple counts and for future trial judges to impose consecutive sentences after Apprendi, allowing them to reach the same results as enhancements without using the forbidden enhancement mechanism. It is hard to see how the Court could or would extend Apprendi's limit on sentencing-enhancement procedures to plug this loophole by regulating charging practices and concurrent and consecutive sentences.
20.
King & Klein, supru note 1, at 300 n.23.
21.
Perhaps the Court will at some point in the future come up with a rule that regulates these practices, but Apprendi itself does not do so. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.l6 (acknowledging that legislatures could ''hypothetically" evade the Ap prendi rule by raising maxima). Given the slender one-vote majority in Apprendi, it seems unlikely that the Court will extend Apprendi t�u· enough to regulate prosecutors' traditionally unreviewable charging discretion and legislatures' almost unfettered latitude to set maximum sentences. 24. Professors King and Klein point to benef its that tlow fr om grading offenses, but we could reap most of these benetits by having legislatures outline culpability fa ctors rather than rigid maxima, or having sentencing commissions set up more flexible grades as part of a real-offe nse system. There are many ways to achieve these benefits, and in this fo otnote I can sketch only a few suggested methods. First, legislatures could draft sentencing enhancements designed to evade Apprendi, by fo r example setting high maxima and then designating fa cts that, if fo und by sentencing judges, would lower those maxima. Second, legislatures (or sentencing commissions) could set fo rth fa ctors and criteria that should guide sentencing discretion. much as they already do in capital sentenc i ng. Judges, ra ther than apply ing mathematical fonm!lac. would weigh and balance these criteria and give reasoned explanations of why the fac tors and criteria led them to panicular sentences. Third, unless and unt i l the Court extends Apprendi to scntencing guidelines. sentencing commissions can continue to usc guide l i ne cnhancements to tailor punishment to defendants' real offenses, checking prosecutors · power to dictate sentences through their charging and plea-bargaining decisions.
